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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that the average return on R&D spending in scientiﬁc research decreases
with ﬁrm size. I provide an explanation to this fact by developing a model of science production
where heterogeneous researchers are endogenously allocated to diﬀerent ﬁrms. The main assumption
is that ﬁrms invest in research to increase their absorptive capacity : the ability to use and understand
scientiﬁc ﬁndings produced elsewhere. Firms create absorptive capacity by building labs and hiring
researchers in a competitive market. Because of externalities, ﬁrms underinvest in labs. More
interestingly, researchers and labs are substitutes in the revenue function, even though they are
complements in the research production function. As a consequence, the greater the investment in
science, the lower the productivity of the researcher working for the ﬁrm. This generates a novel
form of ineﬃciency: for any given investment, the allocation of researchers to ﬁrms is non optimal.
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1 Introduction
If ﬁrms invest in research to beneﬁt from the scientiﬁc ﬁndings produced internally, big
ﬁrms should be more productive than small ﬁrms in their research eﬀort. Big ﬁrms gain
more than small ﬁrms from increasing their scientiﬁc output, since they capture a greater
share of the total beneﬁt (private beneﬁt plus social beneﬁt) derived from the extra science
produced. It follows that big ﬁrms should always manage to outbid small ﬁrms in order
to purchase any factor relevant to the production of science. Big ﬁrms should hire the
most productive researchers, purchase the best equipment, be located in the best spots and,
ultimately, be more productive than small ﬁrms. However several sources document that
the average return on research spending decreases with ﬁrm size. For example, Halperin and
Chakrabarti (1987) ﬁnd that the number of papers produced per dollar of R&D spending is
negatively correlated with ﬁrms size and with total R&D spending.1
In this paper I build a model of science production where heterogeneous researchers are
hired by ﬁrms in order to work in their labs. The ability of each researcher determines the
scientiﬁc productivity of the ﬁrm's lab. In order to explain the empirical puzzle discussed
above, I assume that ﬁrms carry out research in order to increase their absorptive capacity :
the ability to use outside science. Research provides a ticket of admission to an information
network:2 it allows ﬁrms to be always up to date with the science produced by other ﬁrms
and universities. Also, science is diﬃcult: only scientists that are actively engaged in research
can read and understand several papers in a timely fashion. In other words, using publicly
available science can be costly to ﬁrms; this cost is lower when ﬁrms produce more in-house
research.
Intuitively, absorptive capacity implies that ﬁrms produce science so that their in-house
researchers can be part of the scientiﬁc community. Once ﬁrms reach the required scientiﬁc
output, doing additional research generates little extra beneﬁt: ﬁrms do not want to produce
Nobel-prize-winning research. In order to achieve this goal, ﬁrms can either invest in labs
or hire a very productive researcher: researchers and labs can be substitutes in the revenue
function. This implies that the competitive market generates a misallocation of researchers
to labs. In my stylized model, this takes the form of Negative Assortative Matching (NAM)
rule: the worst researcher works with the biggest lab.
Therefore, if absorptive capacity is the only determinant of the investment in research,
the model predicts a negative correlation between size of the investment and scientiﬁc pro-
ductivity. Also, if bigger ﬁrms have lower cost of investing, there is a negative correlation
1 See also Scherer (1965), Acs and Audretsch (1987), Cohen and Klepper (1996) who review the empirical
evidence. However Halperin and Chakrabarti (1987) are the most relevant here because they looks explicitly
at scientiﬁc output.
2 Rosenberg (1990), p.170
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between ﬁrms size and scientiﬁc productivity. This is consistent with the empirical evidence
showing that productive R&D workers are more likely than unproductive R&D workers to
be hired by small ﬁrms.3
At the same time I assume that researchers and labs are complements in the research
production function; the total science produced is maximized under a Positive Assortative
Matching (PAM) rule assigning the best researchers to the biggest labs. Therefore, in the
allocation of researchers to labs, there is a trade-oﬀ between producing science and using
science. Since ﬁrms aim at using science, for any given investment in labs the private sector
minimizes the amount of science produced. The decentralized allocation of researchers to
labs is ineﬃcient. This ineﬃciency is novel and arises in addition to the usual underinvest-
ment in science. I show that an appropriate set of taxes/subsidies to the amount of science
produced by each ﬁrm can solve the ineﬃciency by inducing the ﬁrst-best investment and
the ﬁrst-best allocation of researcher to ﬁrms. However, subsidies to the investment in labs
cannot restore eﬃciency since they do not aﬀect the job-market for researchers.
In the second part of the paper I enrich the model by introducing universities. I assume
that their mission is to produce science and that academic scientists can work as consultants
for the private sector. The job of a consultant is to help a ﬁrm using the available stock of
science. Scientists endogenously sort between the university sector and the private sector.
Under these assumption, I show that the best researchers are hired by universities, and
within universities researchers are allocated according to PAM: better researchers get to
work with bigger labs. These researchers consults for the small ﬁrms, while large and
productive ﬁrms will hire scientists. Therefore, within the university sector the model
predicts a positive correlation between size of the investment and research productivity.
Finally, I extend the model by assuming that researchers care about reputation, which
is built by producing science. I show that, if reputation concerns are strong enough, the
equilibrium in the private sector may switch from NAM to PAM. Intuitively, researchers
are willing to receive lower wages in order to work in ﬁrms with big labs. In addition,
for a given lab, productive researchers are willing to forfeit a bigger portion of their wages
than unproductive researchers. In the new competitive equilibrium, productive researchers
work in big labs, but may be paid less than unproductive researchers because they receive
a higher reputation reward. Therefore reputation aﬀects the production of science not by
changing the researchers' incentives (as in Dasgupta and David (1985)) but by aﬀecting
the job market for scientists. The prediction of the model is that scientiﬁc sectors where
3 See Zenger (1994) and Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010), the latter being the most relevant since
it looks at scientists. The explanations oﬀered in the literature rely on the assumption that small ﬁrms
oﬀer tighter performance-contingent contracts than big ﬁrms, and therefore attract more productive agents.
With respect to the job market for scientists, my paper can be interpreted as an alternative explanation,
having a very diﬀerent implication with respect to the market eﬃciency (see the next paragraph).
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reputation concerns are stronger are more likely to display a positive correlation between
size of the investment in scientiﬁc research and research productivity.
1.1 Relevant Literature.
There are several pieces of evidence showing that, because of local spillover, the presence of
very productive scientists has a positive impact on the productivity of ﬁrms4. However, the
eﬃciency properties of the the job market for researchers have not been discussed before,
despite headline-grabbing stories about elite scientists leaving one country for another coun-
try, or leaving one ﬁrm for another ﬁrm.5With this respect, the contribution of this paper is
to show that the allocation of scientists across ﬁrms is not a zero-sum game: the decentral-
ized job market for scientists can be ineﬃcient. If the social planner could reallocate some
scientists, social welfare would increase.
The fact that the allocation of talented agents across sectors and occupations can have
important aggregate welfare consequences is not new. However, the argument is usually
that, by joining diﬀerent sectors, productive agents will be doing diﬀerent things (see, for
example, Baumol (1996) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991)), or they will be subject
to a diﬀerent set of incentives (in the context of science and scientiﬁc research, see Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Stein (2008)). With respect to these works, the contribution of my paper
is to show that, even if scientists are always doing research, according to the same production
function, it does matters whether a given researcher joins the for-proﬁt research sector or
the university sector, because resources are organized diﬀerently in diﬀerent sectors.
It has long been observed that sometimes ﬁrms carry out scientiﬁc research to be more
eﬀective at using outside science. This idea was ﬁrst brought forward by Tilton (1971),
who analyzes the semiconductor industry during the '50s and '60s. Tilton observes that,
for these ﬁrms, investing in research was a form of insurance: they were always guaranteed
to be up to date with the latest scientiﬁc breakthrough. The term absorptive capacity was
introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who provide both the ﬁrst theoretical model of
this concept and its ﬁrst empirical test. Other important empirical works are Cockburn and
Henderson (1998), Gambardella (1992) and Griﬃth, Redding, and Reenen (2004). On the
theory side, several researchers explored the strategic implications of absorptive capacity
(see, for example, Hammerschmidt (2006), Kamien and Zang (2000) and Leahy and Neary
(2007)). In particular, Leahy and Neary (2007) derive some policy implications by showing
that research joint ventures may decrease the amount of research carried out by ﬁrms. The
4 See the literature on knowledge spillover and geography of innovation reviewed in Audretsch and Feldman
(2004).
5 For example Liu, M. (2009, November 14). Steal This Scientist. Newsweek ; or Climbing Mount Pub-
lishable: the old scientiﬁc powers are starting to lose their grip. (2010, November 11). The Economist.
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reason is that ﬁrms invest in research partly to be able to use outside science. When the
access to science is made easier by the creation of a joint venture, there is no need to carry
out much research anymore.
My paper relies on the assumption that, because of absorptive capacity, there is a strong
form of decreasing returns in science. This particular point is supported by Gittelman
and Kogut (2003). The goal of their paper is to establish whether valuable science leads
to valuable patents. The authors measure the quality of the scientiﬁc output by counting
the number of citations received by papers produced within a given ﬁrm. Similarly, they
measure patent quality by adding all the citations received by patents produced by the same
ﬁrm. They ﬁnd that scientiﬁc knowledge and patents are related, but good publications and
good patents are not.6 In other words, producing some science deliver some beneﬁt, but
producing a lot of science does not (actually, in some of their speciﬁcations, the relationship
between valuable patents and valuable science is negative).
Finally, the existing empirical investigations on the allocation of resources to researchers
deal exclusively with speciﬁc public institutions. For example, Arora, David, and Gam-
bardella (1998) analyze the funding allocation decisions of the Italian CNR (equivalent to
the NSF) and show that the reputation (past publication record) is the main explanatory
variable. I am not aware of any study looking at the determinants of the allocation of
resources to researchers working in the private sector.
In the next section, I describe the model. In the second section, I characterize the
equilibrium for a given distribution of labs. In the third section, I derive the distribution
of labs, formally deﬁne the equilibrium, and prove its existence. In the fourth section I
discuss the normative aspects of the model. I introduce universities in the ﬁfth section,
and reputation in the sixth section. In the last section I conclude by discussing possible
empirical tests, policy implications, and extensions.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of ﬁrms and a continuum of researchers. Firms
diﬀer in their size s, continuously distributed over S = [0, s¯]. Researchers diﬀer in their
ability a, continuously distributed over A = [0, a¯]. All agents have the same outside option
assumed to be zero. The economy runs for three periods.
2.1 Investing in Labs.
In period t = 0 ﬁrms build labs. If a ﬁrm s sets up labs of size L it bears a cost c(s, L)
continuous, positive, with continuous ﬁrst and second derivative, increasing in L, decreasing
6 Gittelman and Kogut (2003), p. 380.
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t = 3t = 2t = 1
Invest in labs Split surplusMatch and produce science
Generate surplus
Fig. 1: Timeline
in s, with ∂
2c(s,L)
∂L2 ≥ 0, ∂
2c(s,L)
∂L∂s < 0 and c(s, 0) = 0∀s.
2.2 Producing Science.
In period t = 1, each researcher is hired by one ﬁrm and works in the ﬁrm's lab. The amount
of research produced within each match is:
R(a, L) = af(L)
where f(L) ≥ 0, f ′(L) > 0, and f ′′(L) ≤ 0. Note that the two inputs are complements in
the research production function. This implies that, for given distribution of labs, the allo-
cation of researchers to labs that maximizes the production of science is Positive Assortative
Matching (PAM): the most productive researcher should work in the biggest lab.
The reader should interpret the lab size L as everything that can increase the chance of
a discovery for given researcher's ability. This include physical machines (a bigger telescope,
a more powerful microscope, a state of the art DNA sequencing machine), as well as the
number of technicians and post-docs. The fact that some of these inputs do not require
an investment ex-ante but can be purchased after hiring the researcher will turn out to be
irrelevant. In the next section I will show that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms invest taken as given
the researcher allocated to them. This implies that the timing could be reversed with no
eﬀect on the equilibrium investment.
Finally, in real life, researchers work in team. This can be incorporated into the model
by deﬁning a as the research team's average quality. A previous matching stage determines
how researchers form research teams, and how from a distribution of individual ability we
can derive the distribution of a. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I will not
pursue this interpretation further.
2.3 The Private Beneﬁt of Research.
At the beginning of the last period (t = 2) there is a stock of new science available in the
economy. Call its expected commercial value V , and interpret it as the value of all the
patents that can be produced out of the available science. The private surplus generated
by a match between a researcher and a ﬁrm during period t = 1 depends on the amount of
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research carried out in house and the aggregate science V . I assume that the private surplus
has an additive form:
Φ(a, L, s) = sV − g(af(L))
where g() is continuous and diﬀerentiable, g′() < 0 and g′′() > 0. The surplus produced is
then split between researcher and ﬁrm. Finally, V is taken as given by ﬁrms and researchers
but will be determined endogenously.
Note two things. First, ﬁrms do not compete with each other on the product market.
The reader should imagine a scientiﬁc ﬁeld where many small ﬁrms produce patents out
of the same scientiﬁc base. For example, ﬁrms may belong to the bio-tech sector, some
developing DNA sequencing machines, some developing drugs, others developing bacteria
that can produce bio-fuel out of garbage. Some ﬁrms will compete, some will not compete,
some other will complement each others. For this reason I abstract from competition issues.
Second, ﬁrm's size aﬀects the beneﬁt of producing science: the beneﬁt of a new patent are
greater for bigger ﬁrms. It follows that size matters in two ways: directly and through the
investment L.7
The interpretation of the above speciﬁcation is that, because of absorptive capacity,
ﬁrms carry out in-house research in order to decrease the cost of using the public stock of
science. However, the function g(x) could be everywhere negative, implying that science is
always carried out for a direct beneﬁt. Therefore, nothing in the mathematical formulation
presented so far contains the absorptive capacity hypothesis. The following two assumptions
formally introduce it into the model:
Assumption 1. It is impossible to understand a new piece of science if no research is
carried out in house: lim
x→0
g(x) =∞.
Remember that V represents the new science that will be introduced tomorrow. Under
the above assumption, ﬁrms need to produce some in-house science today if they want to
be active in the market and exploit the new aggregate science V . Note that this does not
imply that the science produced in-house should be enough to lead to any publication or
scientiﬁc discovery, neither it implies that all the ﬁrms active in the market invest in labs
(it will depend on the speciﬁc functional form of f(L)), but it does mean that all the ﬁrms
active in the market hire a researcher.
Assumption 2. The marginal beneﬁt of producing science is decreasing rapidly: g′′′(x) > 0.
Assumption 2 captures the following consideration. Absorptive capacity implies that
ﬁrms produce science so that their in-house researchers can be part of the scientiﬁc com-
munity. Let's say that this is achieved by attending conferences. It follows that a ﬁrm will
7 In general, the private surplus could be Φ(a, L, s) = η(s)V − g(af(L)) with η(s) strictly increasing. To
save on notation, I assume that η(s) = s.
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want to produce enough science so that its researcher can attend conferences, but producing
even more science provides little extra value. Therefore, the marginal beneﬁt a ﬁrm's enjoy
from doing research is decreasing rapidly.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1 and 2, from the private sector's point of view the two
inputs are always substitutes:
∂2Φ(a, L, s)
∂a∂L
< 0 for every a, L ∈ R+
The proof of proposition 3 is based on the fact that, when both assumptions 1 and 2
hold, the curvature of the cost function g() is given by:
−g
′′(af(L))
g′(af(L))
>
∂2R
∂a∂L
∂R
∂a
∂R
∂L
=
1
af(L)
This curvature implies substitutability.
Are assumptions 1 and 2 strong? Are they realistic? To have an intuitive grasp of what
is going on, assume for a moment that g() is an isoelastic function. Assumptions 1 and 2
imply that g() is bounded below. This is quite natural if there is no production motive and
g() only represents the cost of using the public science. In this case, ﬁrms invest in labs to
reduce their cost. It follows that the beneﬁt a ﬁrm receives from carrying out research is
never above V . This assumptions can also accommodate the case where there is a direct
beneﬁt of producing science, in the sense that g() can be negative, as long as this beneﬁt
has an upper bound.8 However, it may be restrictive if the production motive is particularly
strong.
In what follows, I will assume that absorptive capacity is the main reason why ﬁrms
carry out research in the sense that assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. In subsection 3.1 I
will discuss more in depth the consequences of relaxing these two assumptions.
2.4 Endogenous Science.
The value of science is taken as given by ﬁrms but it is determined endogenously aggregating
all the research carried out in the economy. Call ν the expected commercial value of a unit
of research and h(L) the p.d.f of L. The expected value of the stock of science is given by:
V = ν
∫
m(L)f(L)h(L)dL (1)
8 It is possible to show that boundedness implies local substitutability for large enough af(L). However
to have global substitutability one needs to assume 1 and 2: boundedness and assumption 1 or boundedness
and assumption 2 are not enough.
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where the functionm(L) : R+ → {A, ∅} assigns labs to researchers, with the convention that
m(L) = ∅ represents an unmatched ﬁrm. The function m(L) is determined in equilibrium.
3 The Equilibrium for Given Investment in Labs and for Given
Aggregate Science.
In this section, I derive the equilibrium arising in period t = 1, when ﬁrms have already
invested in labs. I analyze the problem taking as given the total amount of science produced
in the economy V , and the investment made by each ﬁrm.
Let's introduce the following notation:
• i(s) : S → R+, the equilibrium investment in labs made by a ﬁrm s.
• m˜(s) ≡ m(i(s)) : S → A, the matching rule on the equilibrium path (for investment
performed by some ﬁrms) mapping ﬁrms to researchers.
• x(s, L) : S × R+ → R+, the payoﬀ of a ﬁrm of size s and with lab L.
• x˜(s) ≡ x(s, i(s)) : S → R+, the payoﬀ of ﬁrms on the equilibrium path.
• w(a) : A→ R+, the payoﬀ of a researcher with ability a.
I conjecture that the function i(s) is strictly increasing. This conjecture will be proven
in the next section.
Deﬁnition 4. For given V , the job market for researchers is in equilibrium if:
• Feasibility: x˜(s) + w(m˜(s))) ≤ Φ(m˜(s)), i(s), s) ∀s.
• Stability: x˜(s) + w(m˜(s′))) ≥ Φ(m˜(s′)), i(s), s) ∀s, s′.
The existence of a unique equilibrium for given V is a standard result in matching theory
(see, for example, Kamecke (1992)).
Proposition 5. Negative assortative matching (NAM) in the job market for researchers:
the most productive researchers work in the smallest labs and the least productive researchers
work in the biggest labs. Similarly, the most productive researchers work in the smallest ﬁrms
and the least productive researchers work in the biggest ﬁrm.
Proof. For given s, the two inputs L and a are global substitutes. It follows that, for given
s, the equilibrium matching between a and L is NAM. The result follow from the fact that
i(s) is increasing in s, since s enters linearly in the private surplus function.
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From the ﬁrms' point of view, researchers and labs are substitutes. Since the private
sector allocates researchers to labs so to maximize their marginal product, it follows that, in
equilibrium, the most productive researchers will work in the smallest labs. However, labs
and researchers' ability are complements in the research production function. The matching
rule maximizing the total stock of science is PAM: the best researcher should work in the
biggest lab. Therefore, the private sector, for a given distribution of labs, is minimizing the
value of science V . There is a trade-oﬀ between maximizing science and maximizing the use
of science. Since the private sector only considers the latter, the decentralized equilibrium
is ineﬃcient.
Proposition 6. For given distribution of labs, if ν is high enough, the matching pattern
emerging in the private sector is ineﬃcient.9
Proof. See appendix.
3.1 Discussion.
Proposition 6 shows that the competitive equilibrium allocation of researchers to labs is
ineﬃcient so that, for given distribution of labs, the production of science is ineﬃcient. This
result is robust to several modiﬁcation of the baseline assumptions, although the model may
become impossible to solve.
First of all, the fact that science enters additively in the private-surplus function is not
relevant. Consider a generic Φ(a, L, s). If assumption 1 and assumption 2 hold (with the
appropriate modiﬁcations) then the two inputs will remain substitutes. Assuming that the
social-welfare function has some range of complementarity, the private sector equilibrium
allocation is, again, ineﬃcient.
Suppose now that assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold. Proposition 6 shows that if over
some range with positive mass of researchers and labs the social-welfare function is super-
modular while the private-surplus function is submodular the private sector allocation is
ineﬃcient. The reason is that, over that speciﬁc range, the equilibrium matching will be
NAM, but welfare can be improved by implementing PAM. Therefore, even in situations
where assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold, it is possible for the private sector matching pattern
to be ineﬃcient. However, if the function Φ(a, L, s) is not globally submodular in a and
L, the exact allocation of labs to researchers arising in the market can only be determined
numerically.
It is also interesting to check what happen when the two inputs are global complements
in the private-surplus function, so that there is no ineﬃciency in the matching stage. Lemma
9 The equilibrium concept used in this model is called F-core, and the type of externality is called
widespread externality. For a theoretical analysis of the ineﬃciencies of an F-core economy with widespread
externalities see Hammond, Kaneko, and Wooders (1989) and Hammond (1995).
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8 in the next section will show that ﬁrms underinvest in labs because they do not fully appro-
priate the beneﬁt of new science. Therefore, if labs and researchers are global complements,
the model collapses back to a standard model of science production where the only source
of ineﬃciency is the ﬁrms' underinvesment.
4 The Ex-Ante Equilibrium
The deﬁnition of equilibrium I use is similar to the one in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001). The diﬀerences are that, here, only one of the two sides invests, and the ﬁrm's type
aﬀect the total surplus not only through the investment, but also directly.
Deﬁnition 7. The quadruple {i(.),m(.), x(.), w(.)} constitutes an equilibrium if:
1. The investment is optimal:
i(s) = arg max
L≥0
{x(s, L)− c(s, L)}
2. Ex post, the matching {i(.), m˜(.), x˜(.), w(.)} is feasible and stable:
• Feasibility: x˜(s) + w(m˜(s)) ≤ Φ(m˜(s), i(s), s) ∀s ∈ S.10
• Stability: x˜(s) + w(m˜(s′)) ≥ Φ(m˜(s′), i(s), s) ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
3. For any ﬁrm s, the payoﬀ from investing is
x(s, L) = maxa {Φ(a, L, s)− w(a)}
To understand the deﬁnition, assume that there is an equilibrium, and consider devia-
tions made by a single ﬁrm. Since we are in a large economy, any action this ﬁrm may take
has no impact on the equilibrium w(a). Therefore, whatever the investment, this ﬁrm can
match with any researcher a provided that it pays w(a).
Lemma 8. In equilibrium, for L ≥ 0:
∂x(s, L)
∂L
=
∂Φ(a, L, s)
∂L
|a=m(L)
Proof. From point 3 of the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
10 The general deﬁnition of feasibility is more complicated (see Cole et al. (2001)). However, in the cases
I consider here it is possible to use this simpler version.
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Lemma 8 implies that ﬁrms' investment solves:
∂c(s, L)
∂L
=
∂Φ(a, L, s)
∂L
|a=m(L) (2)
In other words, ﬁrms maximize surplus taking V and the researchers they will be matched
with as given. Since the social planner would take into account the impact of the individual
investment on the total stock of science, lemma 8 implies that the investment is ineﬃcient.
Finally, note that the matching pattern expected to emerge in the following period aﬀects
the investment decisions. It follows, for example, that any policy attempting to change the
allocation of researchers to labs will aﬀect the investment and may turn out to be counter-
productive.11 Also, any subsidy to the investment in labs may reduce the underinvestment,
but it is unable to aﬀect the ineﬃciency in the matching between labs and researchers. In
the next section I will show that the only way to reach the ﬁrst best in this economy is using
a set of taxes and subsidies to the amount of science produced by each ﬁrm.
Lemma 9. In equilibrium the biggest ﬁrm hires the least productive researcher:
m˜′(s) < 0
Proof. See appendix
Before showing the existence of an equilibrium, let's introduce a new piece of notation.
Let's call l(a) ≡ i(m˜−1(a)) the lab a researcher of ability a receives in equilibrium.
Proposition 10. An equilibrium with zero research always exists. If the commercial value
of research ν is high enough, there are also equilibria where a positive amount of science
is produced. In these equilibria, researchers belonging to the set [a, a] match with ﬁrms
investing l(a), where:
l(a) = max
{{
L ∈ R+ : ∂Φ
∂L
=
∂c
∂L
}
, 0
}
(3)
a : ν
∫ a
a
af(l(a))z(a)da =
P (a) + g(af(l(a)))
m˜−1(a)
(4)
P (a) =
∫ m˜−1(a)
m˜−1(a)
∂c(s, i(s))
∂L
γ(s)ds (5)
z(a) is the p.d.f. of a, and γ(s) is the p.d.f of s.
Proof. See appendix.
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a(V )
a
V
a
V (a)
Fig. 2: Equilibrium a and V .
Figure 2 illustrates the case of two positive investment equilibria, given by the intersec-
tion of V (a) and a(V ), where V (a) represents the aggregate science produced as a function
of the measure of researchers employed, and a(V ) represents the worst researcher employed
in the economy for given aggregate science V . Of the two equilibria represented in ﬁgure 2,
one can be considered stable (the high V , low a one) and the other unstable.
By focusing on the stable equilibrium, it is possible to make a few comparative static
exercises. If the value of a discovery ν increases, V (a) moves upward: more researchers are
matched and more research is produced. It is also possible to introduce an exogenous stock
of science V f , science produced, for example, by a foreign country. The graph should be
modiﬁed by writing on the vertical axes V h instead of V , and by shifting a(V h) downward:
home country is producing more research as well. Obviously, all the comparative statics are
reversed if we consider the unstable equilibrium.
5 The First Best
The social welfare generated within each match is:
SW (a, L) = sνaf(L)− g(af(L))
11 Gall, Legros, and Newman (2009) analyze this problem in a diﬀerent context.
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This function is neither globally supermodular nor globally submodular. It follows that
the optimal allocation of researchers to labs can only be derived numerically, and it may
involve implementing PAM over some range, and NAM over some other range. Intuitively,
the social planner may, over some range, give priority to the production of science, and over
some other to the use of science.
However, we know that the social planner problem has a unique solution. This implies
that the ﬁrst best allocation can be easily implemented if transfers based on the amount of
science produced by each ﬁrm are feasible.12
Proposition 11. The ﬁrst best is implementable announcing the following rule: every ﬁrm
producing some science receives a transfer equal to its size times the value of the science
produced by that ﬁrm minus V .
Since there is a mass 1 of ﬁrms, V is the value of the average amount of science produced.
Therefore, ﬁrms producing more than the average receive a subsidy, while the others are
taxed. However, even if scientiﬁc output is observable, it is usually non contractible and,
therefore, non taxable. For this reason, the ﬁrst-best implementation has little practical
interest.
6 The University Research Sector
Given the technical diﬃculties in dealing with the ﬁrst best, from now on I switch to a
positive analysis. I will introduce into the model new elements: universities, the government,
and reputation concerns for researchers. I will then describe how they interact with the
private sector and the decentralized equilibrium, and I will show that these policies and
institutions play an important role in determining how resources are allocated to researchers.
To start, I will introduce into the model the sector that, in most countries, produces the
vast majority of new science: universities.
6.1 Consultants.
As before, let's start analyzing the problem taking the distribution of labs as given. Univer-
sities are made up of labs. If a researcher a works in a university, he receives a lab of size
lu(a). Researchers working in a university in period t = 1 can then work as consultants in
period t = 2.
This assumption is motivated by the literature on star scientists. Zucker, Darby, and
Brewer (1998) show that the birth of the biotechnology industry during the 1970s in a
particular region can be explained by the presence of star scientists: researchers with an
12 See Hammond (1995).
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outstanding research track in genetics. These scientists worked in academia, and, at the
same time, were active as consultants, were part of the board of companies, and sometimes
even created their own start-ups. Doing so, they brought into these private labs the public
science they contributed to create.13 For simplicity, I will refer to all these activities as
simply consulting.
If an academic researcher works as consultant, the disutility the researcher has to incur
in period t = 2 is equal to g(R(a, lu(a))), so that the total surplus created by a match
between a ﬁrm and a researcher/consultant is:
Φ = sV − g(R(a, lu(a)))
Therefore, researchers (and ﬁrms) prefer the researcher to work in the university sector if
lu(a) ≥ l(a): in the university sector the researcher works in a lab bigger than the one she
would work in if she had stayed in the private sector. Because of NAM in the private sector,
for any lu(a), the most productive researchers are willing to join the university sector. These
researchers will then consult for the smallest ﬁrms (that, anticipating this, will not invest),
while big ﬁrms will invest in lab and hire their own researchers.
6.2 University Labs and Subsidies.
In order to derive the size of the university sector endogenously, I introduce into the model a
government, and I assume that its objective is to maximize the total stock of science under
an exogenous resource constraint.14 It is important to stress I'm performing a positive
analysis and not a normative one. In most countries, the government plays a crucial role in
determining the amount of research carried out within the economy. My goal is to introduce
it into the model in the most reasonable way and to analyze the impact of its policies on
the overall production of science.
I assume that the government can employ its resources either to subsidize the production
of labs, or to build a university research sector. Subsidies are cheaper than ﬁnancing univer-
sities since they build on top of what ﬁrms are already investing. However, subsidies have
no impact on the matching phase. Instead, building universities, although more expensive,
allows the government to choose the optimal allocation of researcher to labs. Note that in
the standard public good model of science there is little diﬀerence between direct provision
of science or subsidies to private research. Here these two policies achieve diﬀerent goals
13 Note how both the star scientists literature and the absorptive capacity literature focus on sectors where,
for ﬁrms, it is crucial to be up to date with the latest scientiﬁc discovery. For example, in biotechnology,
once a piece of science reaches a textbook and becomes accessible without any absorptive capacity building
or star scientist help, this very same piece of science is typically useless to ﬁrms.
14 In the model, the government is uniquely characterized by its objective function. Readers may safely
substitute the word government with, for example, foundations.
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at diﬀerent costs: depending on the conditions, the government will use one, the other or
both.
The introduction of subsidies and universities changes the private sector equilibrium only
marginally. Before the investment phase begins, the government announces lu(a), the lab a
given researcher will receive if he joins the university sector. If a ﬁrm expects to be matched
with a researcher that, by moving to the university sector, would work in a lab bigger than
the one the ﬁrm owns, this researcher should work in a university lab and then act as a
consultant. In the anticipation of this event such a ﬁrm does not invest at all.
Finally, suppose that each ﬁrm receives from the government a transfer τ(L), continuous
and diﬀerentiable. The private surplus function is now Φ(a, L, s) + τ(L). By lemma 8
in equilibrium ∂Φ(a,L,s)∂L +
∂τ
∂L =
∂c
∂L . In the same way, the constrained eﬃcient investment
equilibrium exists and the worst researcher matched is given by Φ(a, l(a), m˜−1(a))+τ(l(a))−
P (a) = c(l(a)). As far as τ(l(a)) = 0, ﬁnding the equilibrium V and a is analogous to the
problem solved in the previous section.
The government problem can be formalized in the following way:
max
Lu(a),τ(l(a))
{ν ∫ a
a
af(lˆ(a))z(a)da} (6)
s.t.

lˆ(a) = max{l(a), lu(a)} (I)
G =
∫ a
a
(τ(l(a)) + lu(a)) z(a)da (II)
l(a) =
{
L : ∂Φ(a,L,s)∂L |a=m(L) + ∂τ∂L = ∂c∂L
}
(III)
∂l(a)
∂a ≤ 0 (IV)
a : ν
∫ a
a
af(l(a))z(a)da = c(l(a)) + g(af(l(a))) + P (a) (V)
τ(L) ≥ 0 (VI)
where lˆ(a) are the labs in use in the economy, some of which are private l(a) and some of
which belong to universities lu(a). The ﬁrst constraint says that whenever researchers can
choose between universities and private labs, they will work in the biggest lab. The second
line is the government budget constraint. The following three say that the investment in labs
induced by the government by means of subsidies is an equilibrium. The last line restricts
τ(L) to be a subsidy rather than a tax.
It is possible to characterize the solution to the government problem.
Proposition 12. In the university research sector, better researchers work in bigger labs.
Proof. In building university labs, the only constraint that matters is constraint (II). There-
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fore, the government will set:
f ′(lu(a)) =
(
a′
a
)
f ′(lu(a′))
for all a and a′ working in the university sector.
Proposition 13. All ﬁrms receiving subsidies invest the same amount.
Proof. The allocation of labs in the university research sector is not achievable using subsi-
dies because of constraint (IV). Therefore if the government uses subsidies, constraint (IV)
is binding:
l(a) = l
for all l(a) receiving a positive subsidy.
Proposition 14. University labs are bigger than subsidized private labs.
Proof. If this were not the case, the government could save money by turning some university
labs into subsidized private labs. It also implies that the government will allocate the best
researchers to the university sector.
Figure 3 provides a careful illustration of the problem. In the top graph, the shaded
area represents the cost borne by the government. In the bottom graph, the shaded area
represents the increase in V due to government intervention.
The government problem is too complicated to be solved analytically. Therefore, I resort
to numerical methods in order to determine when the government should subsidize, build
universities or do both (the details of the simulation are in the appendix). The results are
reported in ﬁgures 4 and 5.
In ﬁgure 4 diﬀerent quadrants report the optimal distribution of labs for diﬀerent values
of a and G (G increases going from left to right, and a increases going from the top down).
Figure 5 summarizes the results of the same exercise for a wider range of a and G. In both
ﬁgures it is evident that, if the quality of the best researcher increases, the government is
more likely to build university labs. When a researcher is very productive, the lab that
he would work with in the private sector is very small: building universities allows the
government to allocate more resources on the most productive researchers. Finally, ﬁgure
5 shows that when the government has more resources, it is more likely to use a mix of
university labs and subsidies, rather than only one of the two policies.
The government's policies increase the equilibrium V . Compared to the economy without
a government, now more entrepreneurs invest and more researchers are matched. This is
represented in the bottom graph of ﬁgure 3 by a decrease in a from a(V ′) (where V ′ is the
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a(V ) aa(V ′)
Subsidized Private SectorPrivate Sector University Sector
a2a1
Increase in V
a
l
a1 a2a(V
′)
L
a(V ) a a
Government Expenditure
R(a, lu(a))
R(a, l)
R(a, l(a))
R
l(a)
lu(a)
Fig. 3: Cost and Beneﬁt of Government Intervention.
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stock of knowledge before government intervention) to a(V ). Whether university research
is a complement or a substitute to private research depends on the number of new ﬁrms
investing in research compared to the number of ﬁrms that stop investing because of the
creation of university labs. In ﬁgure 4, the researchers joining the university sector would
work with small labs in the private sector, so there is little decrease in private investment if
the government increases its expenditure. Simulations (not reported) carried out for several
parameters values always found private and university research to be complements. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the empirical literature. David, Hall, and Toole (2000) review
the existing econometric evidence trying to establish if university and private research are
substitutes or complements. They report that most of the papers looking at aggregate
measures ﬁnd a complementarity eﬀect, while, at the single ﬁrm level, there is evidence of
a substitution eﬀect.
7 Reputation
Since the work of Merton (1957), it is well known that researchers care about reputation.
Merton calls it the race for priority : scientists want to be recognized as the ﬁrst to discover
something. The role of reputation in science has already been explored in the economic
literature by Dasgupta and David (1985). The general conclusion is that, on the one hand,
reputation motivates researchers. This is very important because an incentive scheme based
exclusively on the quality of scientiﬁc output would be very hard to implement. Second,
it fosters openness. This guarantees the circulation of ideas and generates a faster pace
of scientiﬁc progress. Here I will show that reputation may have an additional eﬀect. If
researchers care about science, they may be willing to accept a lower payment to work in
a ﬁrm with a big lab. In equilibrium, good researchers may outbid bad researchers for the
right to work in a given ﬁrm, therefore changing the matching pattern in the private sector.
Let's assume that the researchers' utility is:
U(a) = w(a) + ρ(R(a, l(a)))
where w(a) is the net payment received working for the ﬁrm, and ρ() is the reputation
concern: the utility derived from doing science. Researchers may care about science because
their future earning depend on it (through the reputation they build today), or simply
because they like science. The following lemma shows that if reputation concerns are strong
enough the equilibrium allocation of researchers to ﬁrms will change.
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Lemma 15. Assume that an equilibrium with positive investment exists. If:
ρ′(x) ≥ 0 ∀x (7)
ρ′′(x) = g′′(x)∀x (8)
the equilibrium is PAM between labs and researchers.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, researchers are willing to give up part of their payment in order to work in
a ﬁrm with a bigger lab. Because of the complementarity between labs and researchers, a
productive researcher is always willing to give up more than an unproductive researcher for
the right to work in a ﬁrm with a given lab. Therefore, the ﬁnal allocation of researchers
to labs depends on the ﬁrst derivative of ρ(): how fast the utility grows with the amount of
research produced. Note also that a similar conclusion will be true even if condition 8 is not
satisﬁed. In this case ρ′(x) should be greater than a very complicated expression involving
both g′′(x) and ρ′′(x) (see the appendix for more details).
To conclude, I show that, for any ρ() that satisﬁes lemma 15 there exists an equilibrium.
Proposition 16. Consider a ρ() that satisﬁes lemma 15. An equilibrium with zero research
always exists. If the commercial value of research ν is high enough, there are also equilibria
where a positive amount of science is produced.
Proof. See appendix.
It is possible to characterize the net payment schedule that should emerge in the market
when reputation concerns have the form described in lemma 15.
Lemma 17. Consider a ρ() that satisﬁes lemma 15. If reputation concerns are strong, good
researchers will receive a lower net payment than unproductive researchers. In other words,
if ρ′(R(a, L)) is large enough, w′(a) < 0.
If reputation concerns are strong, good researchers receive a high reputation reward
ρ(R(a, L)). Since, when the allocation is PAM, the disutility g() is decreasing in ability, this
implies that the equilibrium gross payment (the wage) can be decreasing in a.
Therefore, the model is consistent with Stern (2004). In his paper Do Scientists Pay
to be Scientists? the author collects data on job oﬀers received by a sample of biology
Ph.D. job market candidates. He ﬁnds that ﬁrms engaged in science oﬀer wages 25% lower
than ﬁrms that are not engaged in science. The author interprets his results against the
absorptive capacity hypothesis: ﬁrms giving a positive value to the production of science
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should pay researchers that are involved in science more. The alternative explanation is
based on reputation concerns: ﬁrms do science as a way to reward scientists by letting them
build their reputation. Lemma 17 shows that the two explanations can coexist.
Finally, it is possible to sketch what happen in a model with reputation concerns, uni-
versities, and subsidies. Clearly, if reputation concerns satisfy lemma 15, there is no need
for universities and the government can spend all its resources in subsidies. However, if
the lemma does not hold, the private sector allocation will be NAM over some range and
PAM over some other. Universities may still be necessary to make sure the best researchers
receive the biggest labs.
8 Conclusions
There are several reasons for ﬁrms to invest in research. The one proposed most often in the
economic literature is production: ﬁrms invest in research because they want to increase the
stock of science. This explanation imply that bigger ﬁrms should be more productive in their
R&D eﬀort than small ﬁrms. Big ﬁrms gain more than small ﬁrms from any extra science
produced, therefore they should always be able to hire the most productive researchers, have
access to the most productive machines, locate themselves in the best locations. However,
there is empirical evidence that the productivity of R&D investment decreases with ﬁrms'
size.
A second explanation to why ﬁrms invest in research has been recently proposed. Using
outside science is costly to ﬁrms. This cost is lower if ﬁrms produce science. Therefore,
ﬁrms invest in research to enhance their absorptive capacity, which is the ability to use the
publicly available stock of science. In this paper I show that absorptive capacity can explain
the negative correlation between ﬁrms' size and research productivity.
I build a model where ﬁrms build absorptive capacity in order to use outside science. I
show that the private sector allocation is ineﬃcient. In the model, there are researchers of
diﬀerent ability levels and ﬁrms owning labs of diﬀerent sizes. The private sector allocates
researchers and ﬁrms according to NAM: the best researcher works in the smallest lab.
However, this matching pattern minimizes the total research produced in the economy.
I modify the baseline model in two ways. First, I introduce universities. I show that
the best researchers work in university labs, and that, within the university sector, bet-
ter researchers work with bigger labs in order to maximize the total amount of research
produced.
Finally, I explore the eﬀect of reputation. If researchers care about doing research, the
market allocation of researchers to ﬁrms may change. In particular, I show that if the
reputation concerns are strong enough, the matching pattern emerging in the private sector
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is PAM: good researchers work in big labs.
The model can be tested empirically in several ways. For example, it should be possible
to check whether labs and researchers are substitutes in the private sector. Substitability
implies that the increase in revenues following an increase in expenditure in research facilities
should be greater in ﬁrms with researchers that are less productive. Alternatively, one could
check the market allocation of researchers to ﬁrms. In this case, however, the test should
take into consideration the strength of the reputation concerns. Without reputation, the
model predicts NAM. If reputation concerns exist and have the features I derived, we should
observe PAM. For example, assuming that old researchers are less sensitive to reputation
than young ones, the model predicts that productive young researchers should work in big
labs and unproductive young researcher should work in small labs, while productive old
researchers should work in small labs and unproductive old researchers should work in big
labs.
Introducing absorptive capacity opens interesting policy questions. For example, in this
context access to science is a policy instrument. Suppose that ﬁrms can learn about new
discoveries only by sending their researchers to conferences. A rule that allows researchers
from the private sector to participate in conferences only if their scientiﬁc contribution is
above a certain threshold, may increase the amount of research carried out by the private
sector.15 Also, the way researchers are rewarded is an important determinant of the amount
of science produced. It should be possible to transform all the diﬀerent prizes and awards a
researcher may receive during his career into a coherent policy instrument.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
It is straightforward to check that substitutability at a given aˆ, Lˆ is equivalent to:
g′′(aˆf(Lˆ))aˆf(Lˆ)
−g′(aˆf(Lˆ)) > 0
the proof of the proposition requires two steps:
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1. Show that under assumption 2 r(x) ≡
[
g′′(x)x
−g′(x)
]
is increasing in x.
Compute r′(x)
r′(x) =
g′′(x)
−g′(x) +
g′′′(x)x
−g′(x) +
g′′(x)x
(g′(x))2
that is increasing if g′′′(x) > 0.
2. Show that under assumption 1, limx→0r(x) ≥ 1
suppose not: ∃ > 0 arbitrarily close to zero such that g′′() < −g′(). Take an
arbitrary σ > 0 and deﬁne:
K,σ(x) ≡ a,σ
(
x1−σ
1− σ
)
+ b,σ
where a,σ and b,σ are such that:
K,σ() ≡ a,σ
(
1−σ
1− σ
)
+ b,σ = g()
K ′,σ() ≡ a,σ−σ = g′()
since we assumed that g′′() < −g′(), it follows that:
g′′() <
−g′()

= a,σ
−σ−1
because of the strict inequality, it is always possible to take a σ < 1, arbitrarily close
to one, such that:
g′′() < a,σσ−σ−1 = K ′′,σ()
this implies that, in a neighbour of , g(x) < K,σ(x). Finally, note that x = 0 is in a
neighbour of  and at the same time K,σ(0) is well deﬁned for σ < 1. Therefore g(0)
is well deﬁned and ﬁnite. This is a contradiction.
Point 2 alone implies that the inputs are substitutes for small enough af(L). Point 1 and
point 2 imply that the two inputs are always substitutes.
Proof of Proposition 6.
The social welfare generated within each match is equal to:
SW (a, L) = sνaf(L)− g(af(L))
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one obvious diﬀerence between the ﬁrst best allocation and the private sector allocation is in
who is matched. In the private sector, researchers and labs are matched if sV ≥ g(af(L)).
Note that V is determined endogenously, and that there are multiple equilibria. However,
the private sector condition for being matched is, in general, diﬀerent than the social optimal
one.
Going back to the matching pattern, note that NAM is ineﬃcient only under some
conditions on ν. To see this, imagine that the economy is so unproductive (low ν) that
both from the social point of view and from the private point of view, nobody should be
matched. In this case any matching pattern will lead to the same welfare (zero) so that
NAM is trivially eﬃcient.
It is easy to show that SW12 > 0 if:
sν > g′(x) + xg′′(x)
Given this, we can be in one out of three possible situations. The ﬁrst one is illustrated in
ﬁgure 6a. In this case there is no complementarity in the relevant range of the social welfare
function and NAM is eﬃcient. Imagine now to increase ν. The area of complementarity
expands, and eventually we reach the situation illustrated in ﬁgure 6b. In this case, it is
possible for the social planner to reallocate some researchers and some labs in order to have
an area of PAM. However, this leaves some unmatched agents, that should be re-matched
somehow. Whether this deviation increases social welfare or not is left to be determined in
future works. If ν is even higher, eventually the economy will reach the situation depicted
in ﬁgure 6c. In this case it is possible to rematch researchers between a1 and a2 with labs
from L1 and L2 according to PAM and increase the social welfare.
Proof of Lemma 9.
By point 1 in the deﬁnition of equilibrium and using lemma 8 we get:
i′(s) =
csL
ΦLL − cLL
note that csL < 0, cLL > 0, and
ΦLL = −
[
g′′(af(L))
+
(af ′(L))2
+
+ g′(af(L))
−
af ′′(L)
−
]
< 0
so that i′(s) > 0: biggest ﬁrms invest the most. By NAM between researchers and labs, this
implies that biggest ﬁrms hire the least productive researcher.
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a
a¯
Complementarity
LL¯
(a) No Ineﬃciency.
a
a¯
Complementarity
LL¯
(b) Conjecture: ineﬃcient matching.
L
a
a¯
Complementarity
L2L1 L¯
a1
a2
(c) Ineﬃcient matching.
Fig. 6: Complementarity range and matching function.
A Appendix 31
Proof of Proposition 10.
For the ﬁrst part, note that if ﬁrms expect V = 0, they have no reason to invest in research.
Therefore, the total science produced will be zero.
Consider an equilibrium with positive investment. In general, if all the researchers and
all the entrepreneurs in the economy were matched, the worst member of each group could
enjoy a strictly positive payoﬀ. In our case, since the worst researcher in the economy is
a = 0 and lim
a→0
Φ(a, L) = −∞, on both sides there is always someone that is not matched.
Consider the match between the ﬁrm that invested the most and the worst researcher. The
researcher receive a payoﬀ equal to zero, while the ﬁrm receives
x˜(s) =
∫ m˜−1(a)
m˜−1(a)
∂Φ(m˜(s), i(s), s)
∂L
γ(s)ds =
∫ m˜−1(a)
m˜−1(a)
∂c(s, i(s))
∂L
γ(s)ds ≡ P (a)
where γ(s) is the p.d.f. of s, and the second equality follows from lemma 8 and equation 2.
In other words, the payoﬀ received by the most productive ﬁrm depends on the productivity
of the worst researcher matched. The equilibrium a and V are the solutions to:
a =
{
a : Φ(a, l(a), m˜−1(a)) = P (a)
}
(9)
and:
V = ν
∫ a
a
af(L(a))z(a)da (10)
The equilibrium with positive investment exists if there is a {a, V } solution to equations 9
and 10.
Note that equation 10 has a ﬁnite value at a = 0, is equal to zero at a = a, and is strictly
decreasing. Finally, equation 9 can be rewritten as:
V =
P (a) + g(af(L(a)))
m˜−1(a)
(11)
Because of assumption 1, if a→ 0 the solution to 11 diverges to inﬁnity, has ﬁnite values for
a ∈ (o, a], and is continuous. Therefore, if ν is high enough, equations 9 and 10 will cross.
Proof of Proposition 11.
The social welfare generated in each match is equal to:
SW (a, L) = sνaf(L)− g(af(L))
A Appendix 32
the private surplus is:
Φ(a, L) = sV − g(af(L))
clearly, a transfer like the one described transforms the private surplus into the social welfare
function. Finally, because of lemma 8, when ﬁrms invest they equate marginal cost to
marginal beneﬁt. In this case, it implies that ﬁrms' investment is eﬃcient.
Details of the Simulation.
I choose the following functional forms:
• c(s, L) = (1 + r)L
• R(a, L) = af(L) = a(1 + L) 12
• g(R(a, L)) = 1
a(1+L)
1
2
and I assume that τ(l(a)) = 0: the ﬁrm matched with the worst researcher receives no
subsidy. This can be seen as a restriction on the amount of resources the government has.
Note that all ﬁrms are identical.
The government problem can be written as:
max
lu(a),l,a1,a2
{∫ a2
a1
a(1 + l)
1
2 da+
∫ a
a2
a2(1 + lu(a))
1
2 da− ∫ a2
a1
a(1 + l(a))
1
2 da} (12)
s.t.

l =
(
1
2(1+r)a1
) 2
3 − 1 (1)
a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a (2)(
a2
a
)
(1 + lu(a))− 1 ≥ l (3)∫ a2
a1
(
l −max
{(
1
2(1+r)a
) 2
3 − 1, 0
})
da+
∫ a
a2
[(
a
a
)2
(1 + lg(a))− 1
]
da = G (4)
Figure 3 on page 18 represents it graphically. The objective function is the extra research
produced thanks to the policy in place (the shaded area in the lower axes) at a cost sum-
marized by constraint (4) and represented by the shaded area in the upper axis. Note that
the increase in research at the bottom of the distribution of labs (between a(V ) and a(V ′))
can be safely ignored since it is an increasing function of the extra research V produced by
the rest of the economy.
The simulation simply compares values of the objective function at diﬀerent a2 and
l¯. The aim is not to determine the exact optimal policy, but to check whether there is an
interior solution (both subsidies and university labs) or one of the two corner solutions (only
subsidies, only university labs).
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x(L)
Φ(a, L, s)
p(R(L, a)) w(a) + p(R(L, a))
Fig. 7: Utility Possibility Frontier.
I construct a grid {0, ..., a} containing all possible values of a2. For every value of a2, I
construct a grid of possible value of l ∈
{(
1
2(1+r)a2
) 2
3 − 1, ..., l˜
}
where l˜ is an appropriate
large number. For every a2 and l I compute l
u(a) using constraint (4) of 12. I consider the
pair a2 and l admissible if l
u(a2) =
(
a2
a
)
(1 + lu(a))− 1 ≥ l. Finally, I compute the value of
the objective function. The ﬁnal solution is the admissible pair
{
a2, l
}
returning the highest
value.
Finally, in the standard simulation, the value for r is 0.01 and for ν is 100. When checking
for the complementarity or substitability of private and university research, the parameters
I tried are: a ∈ [0, 5], G ∈ [0, 5], r ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1} and ν ∈ {75, 100, 150}; technical reasons
restricted the choice of ν; the other parameters were picked arbitrarily.
Proof of Lemma 15.
Figure 7 represents the utility possibility frontier of a match. For a given distribution of labs,
whenever the equilibrium payoﬀs lie on the 45 degrees part, under lemma 15 the equilibrium
matching is PAM. The reason is that the total surplus function Φ(a, L, s) + ρ(R(a, L))
(transferable between researchers and ﬁrms) is supermodular: ﬁrms with bigger labs are
better oﬀ by matching with more productive researchers, and vice versa.
However, since the wage cannot be negative, the utility possibility frontier has a kink. At
the kink, researchers receive ρ(R(a, L)) and ﬁrms receive Φ(a, L, s). Again, for given s, the
payoﬀ of each side is increasing in the other side's type. This implies that the equilibrium
is PAM for these agents as well.
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Finally, note that both sides prefer to be matched with a high type than with a low
type, even when it means switching from the kink region to the the 45 degree region. This
implies that the equilibrium is PAM overall.
Proof of Proposition 16.
Since lemma 15 imposes restrictions only on the slope of ρ() I can normalize ρ(R(a, l(a))) =
0. This implies that, as before, the worst researcher matched is given by:
Φ(a, l(a), s) = c(l(a)) + P (a)
and the value of the total stock of science in the economy is given by:
V = ν
∫ a
a
af(l(a))z(a)da
This problem is identical to the one solved in the proof of proposition 10.
Proof of Lemma 17.
By stability, whenever w(a) > 0:
Φ(a, i(s), s) + ρ(R(a, i(s)))− x˜(s)) ≥ Φ(a, i(s′), s′) + ρ(R(a, i(s′))− x˜(s′)
Write the same condition for a′, and take limits for a′ → a:
x˜′(s) = ΦLi′(s) + Φs + ρ′RLi′(s)
note that i′(s) > 0 since we are considering only the transferable-utility part of the utility
possibility fronteer. By feasibility:
Φ(m(i(s)), i(s), s) = x˜(s) + w(i(s))
Diﬀerentiate both sides with respect to s. By simple algebra:
w′(a) = Φam′(a) + ΦL + [i′(s)]−1 [Φs − Φa − ρ′]
that is negative if ρ′ is big enough.
